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CHAPTER 5 
Mainstreaming Impact over Time – 
Who Measures What for Whom? 
Renate Schubert*, Markus Ohndorf**, and Moritz Rohling*** 
Abstract 
Within environmental finance, the guiding question of “who measures what for 
whom” can be examined from different angles. In this paper the authors argue 
that, provided environmental markets are well-designed, measuring environmental 
performance is very closely related to measuring financial success for the primary 
actors on the market. Hence, at the aggregate level, market volume can be used as 
a highly correlated proxy for environmental success. In a second-order interpreta-
tion of the guiding question it is, however, revealed that information-related con-
cerns need to go beyond simple measurement issues. It is argued here that transac-
tion costs in the form of information barriers mainly account for inefficiently low 
levels of environmental finance. The authors explore this information-finance 
nexus on a actor-by-actor basis in order to identify the general nature of these bar-
riers. From these general considerations, the authors deduce that a part of these 
transaction costs could be reduced through enabling actors to scale-up overall in-
vestments by pooling small-scale projects. In fact, different actors could assume 
the role of an Information & Technology Broker. Due to limitations in scope, the 
authors focus their analysis on two of these actors: the Clean Development 
Mechanism project developers and energy services companies. As it turns out, 
while seeking to secure project financing, these actors face information related 
barriers on the supply side. Commercial finance institutions apparently have diffi-
culties to assess the risks associated with environmental small-scale projects, 
which is due to the lack of an established credit history as well as a deficit in 
banking expertise for these markets. To overcome such information related barri-
ers, a case for intervention by governments or development finance institutions 
definitely exists. In this context, all measures fostering a “risk-reduced learning by 
doing” seem to be particularly promising. 
                                                          
*  Head of Chair, Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich. 
**  Senior Researcher and Lecturer, Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich. 
***  Research Assistant, Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich. 
 (ed.), 
, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-05087-9_5,
D. Köhn Greening the Financial Sector: How to Mainstream Environmental 
Finance in Developing Countries
165
© The Author(s) 2012
166 Renate Schubert, Markus Ohndorf, and Moritz Rohling 
 
1 Introduction 
According to many scientific sources, it seems quite obvious that global climate 
change is advancing and that mitigation and adaptation measures are needed in 
industrialized as well as in developing countries. Necessarily, an increase in en-
ergy efficiency (EE) and an increasing share of renewable energies (RE) are the 
key mitigation measures. Furthermore, it is commonly recognized that these tech-
nologies also generate beneficial environmental effects beyond climate change 
mitigation. Within each category a plethora of technologies is available. However, 
few of these measures are implemented, which is partly due to a dearth of finan-
cial resources. Clearly missing financial resources affect developing countries 
much more than they affect industrialized countries. Since a large share of green-
house gas (GHG) emission sources, as well as the potential to increase energy ef-
ficiency and the use of renewable energy, stems from developing countries, fi-
nancing projects in environmental markets in developing countries has high prior-
ity. In many cases such projects are small-scale, which generally decreases the 
chances for third-party financing. In this sense, environmental or “green” finance 
for developing countries is a topic worthwhile to discuss in detail. 
When thinking about environmental or “green” finance, it is important to note 
that the term does not refer to any deeds of charity by commercial banks; rather, it is 
clearly driven by the motive of increasing revenues and profits, at least in the longer 
term. In fact, as other authors in this publication point out, the demand for such fi-
nancial services stems from markets that are themselves driven by the profit motives 
of market participants. On such environmental markets, environmental externalities 
are reduced simply because it is rational and profitable for the single actor to do so. 
This is most obvious on markets that are directly created through environmental 
regulations, like the international carbon market. This market emerged because a 
global public good, i.e. greenhouse gas reductions, was privatized through the allo-
cation of tradable emission quotas. The possibility of trading securitized emission 
credits attributes a value to every tonne of CO2 equivalent abated, which is referred 
to as carbon price. It is simply because emission reductions have a value that self-
interested actors have an incentive to implement greenhouse gas reduction projects 
and sell the generated emission offsets on the market.  
The same reasoning can be applied to the other environmental markets dis-
cussed within this publication, notably the markets for projects in the field of En-
ergy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). Other contributors to this publi-
cation point out that activities on these markets would, in fact, generate positive 
cash flows and could even be very profitable. One of the major problems with fi-
nancing such projects is that most investment costs are frontloaded, while returns 
are realized over a longer term. While this is usually not a problem if financial 
markets were efficient, certain characteristics of the market for green finance in 
developing countries significantly hamper the procurement for small-scale pro-
jects. Many of the most important market barriers that were identified within the 
other chapters are informational in nature. As a consequence, the question of “who 
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measures what for whom?” is of particular importance for increasing the levels of 
financing for small-scale projects on environmental markets. 
It is argued below that, when considering such markets, measuring environ-
mental impacts is less of a concern, as these are closely correlated with financial 
success. Hence, when considering the role of information, the major challenge lies 
rather in overcoming the informational barriers preventing the implementation of 
financially viable and environmentally beneficial projects. If market participants 
face large information-related transaction costs, it is important to identify and 
strengthen actors that are able—and have an interest in—reducing these barriers. It 
is in this sense that the above-mentioned question will provide the most valuable 
answers. Therefore, the focus of the analysis lies on actors that can potentially 
play such a role of brokering information. As the business models of these actors 
usually also involve the application of knowledge on available technologies, the 
authors refer to them as Information and Technology Brokers.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Following this introductory section, the 
authors explore the connection between the measurement of environmental im-
provements and financial success on environmental markets. The most important 
measurables for the different actors are presented. In section three, the case for 
enlarging the informational considerations beyond the pure measurement and 
evaluation concerns is established. The authors further present an overview of dif-
ferent information barriers on environmental markets structured by actors, which 
will serve as reference to the more detailed explorations that follow. The focus lies 
on actors that can fulfil the role of an Information and Technology Broker. In sec-
tion 4, the authors present the information-finance nexus in the context of the 
CDM and examine to what extent the project developer could assume the broker-
age role. Special emphasis is laid on small-scale and programmatic CDM. Section 
5 discusses the role of energy service companies in scaling-up EERE investments. 
The paper concludes with section 6. 
2 Measuring Environmental Impact and Financial Success 
If environmental markets are to be a successful instrument for environmental pol-
icy, environmental improvements and expected gains for market participants need 
to be closely correlated. With respect to the markets considered by other authors 
within this publication, this is indeed the case. The primary focus of this publica-
tion is small-scale projects in the fields of energy Efficiency and Renewable En-
ergy (EERE), as well as the generation of greenhouse gas offsets. 
While the connection of carbon offsets to an environmental policy goal is 
straightforward, EERE measures might be considered as only indirectly related to 
environmental concerns. It is true that the motivation for fostering such markets 
might also be based on other policy goals, like the reduction in dependency of a 
country’s economy on oil imports. However, insofar as EERE contributes to the 
reduction of fossil fuel use for energy production, such projects obviously have 
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environmentally beneficial effects, such as reductions in emission of CO2, NOx, 
SO2, and volatile organic compounds. In those cases where EERE projects con-
tribute to a reduction in dependency on nuclear energy, the beneficial environ-
mental effects are the reduction in nuclear waste and risks of radiation due to un-
foreseeable leakages or catastrophic events. Hence the environmental goal under-
lying the policies promoting EERE technologies is usually measured in energy 
units produced through non-renewable sources. Given this goal, the direct rela-
tionship between environmental improvements and the profit motive on this mar-
ket is quite obvious. While energy savings or installation of renewable energy ca-
pacity are primarily striven for by market actors because of their financial gains, 
these gains translate into actions to achieve an environmental goal.  
In both the EERE market and the market for carbon offsets—which are to a 
large extent overlapping—the connection between environmental improvements 
measured in KWh/GWh and tonnes of CO2 equivalents and financial gains is very 
close. In fact, the financial gains of such projects are determined by multiplying 
the respective amounts by the market price—i.e. the price per energy unit or the 
price per carbon certificate—reduced by the investments costs. In fact, this close 
connection lies at the heart of the general idea of environmental markets. As a 
consequence, measuring financial success is closely correlated with measuring en-
vironmental improvements. In the logic of environmental markets the general an-
swer to the question of “who measures what for whom” is, at least in principle, 
very simple: every market participant measures for himself what is in his interest 
to measure. As the major environmental variables on these markets are directly 
accounted for in the actors’ calculations of expected and actual cash flows, the 
major case for monitoring and evaluation lies rather within a thoughtful design of 
environmental markets.  
The problem of environmental market design is most imminent in those mar-
kets which are entirely created through regulation, like the Kyoto carbon markets. 
The demand for the good traded on these markets, i.e. offsets for greenhouse gas 
emissions, crucially depends on the stringency of the emission targets for industri-
alized countries which are defined within the international climate policy negotia-
tions. The only—yet important—instrument that connects the developing coun-
tries to this market is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This mecha-
nism allows for the implementation of projects involving greenhouse gas reduc-
tions,1 which can be sold on the carbon market in form of Certified Emission Re-
ductions (CERs). Each of these certificates represents an offset of one metric 
tonne of CO2 equivalents. On the Kyoto marketplace these certificates, and certifi-
cates stemming from other Kyoto markets, are perfectly fungible, which raises the 
question of how well these certificates represent actual emission reductions.  
                                                          
1 In fact, the CDM also allows for projects aiming for temporary absorption of CO2 
through afforestation or reforestation. The market volume of such project is, however, 
currently rather small. 
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This problem is being addressed through the Kyoto rules, which are to guaran-
tee that the certified reductions would not have occurred without the financial lev-
erage provided by the possibility to sell the certificates. The general principle, re-
ferred to as additionality, is addressed through methods applied for the calculation 
of overall project offsets. The project designer needs to establish a “business as 
usual” scenario, referred to as the baseline, depicting the emission levels that 
would have occurred if the project were not implemented. The number of certifi-
cates generated by a CDM project is then determined by the difference between 
the baseline emissions and the actual emissions still occurring under the project.  
In order to reduce opportunistic misrepresentation of either the baseline or the 
actual project emissions, the CDM is subject to a tight regulatory framework. The 
project details must be thoroughly disclosed, while baseline and actual emissions 
are subject to third party verification. In order to reduce problems of collusion, the 
regulator—the role of which is mainly taken up by the CDM executive board in 
Bonn, Germany—is to execute regular spot checks within the set of all admitted 
CDM projects. The overall process for project admission is hence associated with 
significant transaction costs and is particularly time consuming.2 What is impor-
tant in the context addressed here, however, is the fact that all issues of measure-
ment, monitoring and verification of carbon offsets are addressed within this CDM 
regulatory process. Hence, once a project is registered and certificates for green-
house gas reductions are issued, the CDM market is not different from any other 
market on which standardized goods are traded.  
In summary, the answer to the question of “who measures what for whom” is, 
as far as the CDM is concerned, meticulously defined within the Kyoto rules. As a 
legal claim for CDM certificates can only be established if these rules are fol-
lowed, the general logic laid out above should apply: Every actor measures what is 
in his interest to measure. It is to note, however, that the CDM is a market entirely 
built from scratch. This means that all actors involved, particularly the regulators, 
need to learn how to best operationalize this general logic within the implementa-
tion of the mechanism. Addressing these issues would, however, require going 
into a level of detail which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The general statement that on environmental markets, every actor only meas-
ures those variables that are important for his own decision making raises the 
question of what in fact those objective variables might be. As to the primary 
market participants, the answer is straightforward. Provided an appropriate market 
design, buyers and sellers of privatized environmental goods only need to measure 
their own financial performance in order to foster environmental improvements. 
The same argument can be applied to commercial finance institutions that are to 
provide financing vehicles to these markets. Actors like governments or develop-
ment finance institutions (DFIs), however, first need to define an objective to be 
achieved through potential interventions. In general, it can be rightfully assumed 
                                                          
2 According to Fenhann (2008a), depending on the ex ante verification cycle it may take 
up to three years or more until a CDM project is registered. 
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that these institutions want to foster environmental improvements. The measure-
ment of success for such intervention intended to achieve this goal is rather un-
problematic. Due to the close relationship between such improvements and overall 
market volume, the latter can easily be used as a signal for the former.  
An example of this reasoning is depicted in Figure 1, representing the results 
from the Hungary Energy Efficiency Co-Finance Program (HEECP). This pro-
gramme was headed by the IFC using GEF and IFC funds. The basic instrument 
used was a financial guarantee mechanism that, in cooperation with local finance 
institutions, aimed at building up sustainable commercial lending business for en-
ergy efficiency investment across a range of sectors. The graphic showcases that, 
in principle, measurement of DFI’s impact on environmental finance markets is 
straightforward. The measurement variable of interest is, given the aim of increase 
in overall credit, the amount of investment triggered by the guarantee programme. 
The figure shows that the programme yielded a significant leverage effect, which 
should be at the basis of any guarantee instrument.3  
Concluding these considerations, it can be stated that carefully designed envi-
ronmental markets render the measurement of environmental improvements rather 
unproblematic. The problems here lie rather in the actual design of the regulatory 
framework than in the measurement itself, as the publicly observable data on mar-
ket volumes are closely correlated with environmental improvements. If the logic  
 
Fig. 1. Results from the HEEPC, 1997–2006 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
                                                          
3 World Bank (2008). 
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of environmental markets applies, it is sufficient that every actor evaluates those 
data that are needed to measure and improve his financial performance. This, in 
turn, facilitates the measurement of success for institutions interested in further 
developing markets, like governments or development banks. The base variable of 
evaluation for these actors is the increase in market volume that is attributable to 
the measure applied.  
However, the question of “who measures what for whom” goes in fact deeper 
than a simple identification of measurables for success with respect to these mar-
kets. In fact, the question addresses, at least implicitly, the fact that one of the ma-
jor areas of necessary intervention lies within the area of information flows. In the 
following, the implications of such a “second-degree” interpretation of the guiding 
question will be addressed in more detail.  
3 Information and Green Markets – An Overview 
Any sensible use of the term environmental finance, in its meaning of a market for 
financial services related to markets for environmental goods, presupposes that the 
latter already exist. Hence, considering financing for environmental markets that 
might be created in the future, for example a market for biodiversity, might be in-
teresting but is beyond the scope of the topic discussed here. It goes without say-
ing that the creation of such markets is not within the responsibility of financial 
institutions, but—insofar as they result from regulation—a task for countries’ sov-
ereigns. Any other actor on potential or actual environmental markets has to take 
the regulatory framework as given. The following considerations are therefore 
limited to the markets that were already introduced, notably the carbon market, 
and markets for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE). The discussion 
is further restricted here to what is generally referred to as small-scale projects in 
developing countries, which are usually associated with households, SMEs, and 
municipalities.  
It has been emphasized within the other chapters that lack of knowledge and 
other informational barriers are among the key problems in environmental finance 
markets. These barriers represent simply the costs of collecting and processing the 
information required to take an objectively rational investment decision. As many 
actors perceive—rightfully or not—these costs as being too high, the level of 
small-scale projects on environmental markets is inefficiently low. Reducing these 
costs would surely not solve all problems present on the market for environmental 
finance,4 but most likely result in a significant increase in investment.  
When considering the role of information on environmental finance markets, it 
is necessary to recognise that the information-related challenges vary among the 
                                                          
4 Clearly, if inefficiencies on financial markets hamper the financing of lucrative projects, 
measures for general financial market development will also increase the availability of 
financial vehicles for activities on green markets. 
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key actors on these markets. The relative underinvestment on environmental mar-
kets is also a result of the interaction of all these informational shortcomings. In 
order to discuss the information-related barriers in these markets in a systematic 
manner, it is useful to reduce the complexity of these interactions in an analytical 
framework. A graphical representation of such a reduction is given in Figure 2. 
This figure represents the key actors on environmental finance markets and their 
most important information needs. The actors themselves are interconnected 
through information flows; these flows can be hampered by barriers, also indi-
cated in the figure. Development finance institutions and entities referred to as In-
formation & Technology Brokers can act as catalysers in order to overcome these 
information barriers. In the following, the information-finance nexus on environ-
mental markets is addressed on an actor-by-actor basis.  
 
Fig. 2. Actors and Information Barriers in Environmental Markets  
3.1 Households, SMEs and Municipalities 
In principle, the beneficiaries from small-scale investments in environmental mar-
kets are the end-users themselves. According to the scope defined above, these 
consist of households, SMEs, and municipalities. In the logic of environmental 
markets, where actors pursuing their self-interest yield environmental improve-
ments, these actors should have an incentive to implement such projects by them-
selves. As is amply discussed within the other chapters, this is apparently not the 
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case. The fact that there still exist “big bills left on the sidewalk” is often attrib-
uted to irrational decision making. Another explanation, favoured by many 
economists, is the existence of information barriers. The most apparent barrier 
preventing investments on the markets considered here is simply a lack of aware-
ness of the existence of potentials for savings or additional earnings. End-users are 
often unaware of the existence of better technologies, the associated improve-
ments in cash flows, or the possibilities of tax rebates and subsidies that are avail-
able. The latter is of particular importance for poorer households, which are—
without substantial support—rather preoccupied with improving their living con-
ditions in the short term. A similar argument is often brought forward with respect 
to small enterprises, which tend to prefer investing their limited resources in up-
grades of equipment which is directly related to production. But even where the 
existence of potential government support is known, the actual procedures of tax 
rebate or subsidy schemes are often considered to be too bureaucratic and time 
consuming. Furthermore, the energy and cost saving possibilities of a single pro-
ject or site are usually small compared to the transaction costs, which are not di-
rectly related to information, like negotiation or contracting costs. This is particu-
larly evident in the residential sector when ownership of buildings is shared by 
several private owners.5  
It is probable that the persistence of end-user information barriers stems in 
many cases from the fact that these actors remain rationally uninformed. If the po-
tential gains from projects are smaller than the costs for arranging government 
support and all other cost to be incurred prior to project implementation, it is per-
fectly rational to remain uninformed on these matters. The most promising way to 
overcome this problem is to search for potential aggregators that incur the fix cost 
of information gathering just once and implement a plethora of small-scale pro-
jects. This role is sometimes taken up by municipalities, which can not only im-
plement EERE projects within their own facilities, but are also able to set up pro-
grammes for supporting small-scale projects within their constituency. This has 
been, for example, the case in the Kuyasa low-cost urban housing upgrade project, 
presented in section 4.3, where the city of Cape Town has played a vital role as 
intermediary.  
It is often pointed out that the reluctance of implementing small-scale projects 
is also due to the fact that decision makers tend to apply initially very high but de-
creasing discount rates within individual decisions. This explanation for the lack 
in investment in EERE is quite plausible, as it is backed by ample evidence of such 
hyperbolic discounting in individual decision-making.6 However, the existence of 
high discount rates alone cannot fully explain the relative lack of investment. If 
                                                          
5 WEC (2008); the shared ownership in the residential sector also features a plethora of 
information asymmetries that hamper investments in energy efficiency. A profound 
analysis of these can be found in IEA (2008). 
6 See, for example, Benzion et al. (1989), or Epper et al. (2008). 
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end-users discount future revenues from EERE investments with rates above the 
interest rates, other market participants are able to yield significant gains from ar-
bitrage. As financial institutions can refinance at market interest rates lying way 
below the observed individual time preferences, the overall amount of finance 
procured would have to be significantly larger than actually observed. This hints 
to the fact that not only the primary environmental markets but also the associated 
market for project-finance are subject to significant information barriers, as will be 
shortly recapitulated in the following.  
3.2 Commercial Finance Institutions (CFIs) 
As already pointed out in the introduction, the principles of environmental finance 
are not different from standard project finance. Just as any other investment project, 
EERE investments and greenhouse gas reduction projects are characterized by the 
fact that a large part of the costs are incurred in the start-up phase, while revenue 
streams can be only expected in the longer term. Consequently, the financing needs 
in environmental markets are in principle not different from what commercial fi-
nance institutions are familiar with. Environmental projects need upfront financing 
which—on average—can be expected to be paid back at later points in time. Still, 
there is a significant underprovision of environmental finance, which is the guiding 
theme of this publication. While the lack of demand for such services, discussed 
above, is a reason for low levels of project finance, a significant part of the problem 
can be explained by taking a closer look at the supply side. 
Market observers often point out that financing environmental projects is asso-
ciated with large risks, for which reason commercial banks refrain from procuring 
services to this market. This is not necessarily true for all cases considered here, as 
the revenue streams from energy savings or GHG reductions might be more secure 
than from other investments. It is, however, quite plausible that default risks are 
significantly high in the small-scale context as the collaterals procured by the end-
users are limited. Still, given that the main business of CFIs consists of pooling 
risks over a wide customer base, a large variance alone cannot explain the general 
reluctance for financing potentially lucrative projects.  
It is likely that the actual reason for the lack of financing lies not directly with 
the level of the objective risks associated with environmental projects, but rather 
with the difficulty to assess those risks. As the concept of environmental mar-
kets is quite new, CFIs generally lack financing expertise in this area. In order to 
assess the associated risks properly, a credit history would be necessary, which 
still needs to be generated. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that 
CFIs by themselves will only provide finance to customers with high levels of 
creditworthiness. However, if green finance is to take off in the longer term, 
CFIs need to build up expertise in assessing technologies used, savings and 
earnings that can be expected, etc. Observers also point out that CFIs lack a 
general understanding of the drivers of important markets in this area, such as 
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the international carbon market.7 As will be argued in the following sections, the 
additional risks associated with such projects are in general manageable if suffi-
cient information is provided.  
A specific problem in the context of environmental finance and associated 
transaction costs is investments of the smallest scale, like simple insulation pro-
jects in the residential sector. In such cases, it is likely that the costs of negotiating 
the financing terms exceed the gains from the project. Such transaction costs can, 
again, only be lowered through a bundling of smallest-scale projects by an institu-
tion acting as an aggregator, like the Information and Technology Brokers ad-
dressed below.  
3.3 Governments and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) 
While it is within the logic of environmental markets that most actors are driven 
by self-interest, this should necessarily not be the case for those actors who are 
supposed to set the framework conditions and to facilitate the start-up phase of 
markets. The most important actors in this area are international regulators of the 
carbon market, national governments and development finance institutions. While 
international regulators exclusively concentrate on setting and enforcing the gen-
eral rules applicable to the carbon market, governments and DFIs also interact 
more directly with the primary market participants.  
Government policies might either increase or decrease the incentive to engage 
in environmental markets. A prominent example for a decrease in incentives is the 
case of the often-quoted “perverse” subsidies for carbon- and energy-intensive 
technologies. In general, however, national governments seem to have an interest 
in fostering environmental markets. Many countries have implemented tax rebates 
or subsidy schemes for EERE measures. Further instruments that are applied are 
grants for R&D, the implementation of pilot projects, and the procurement of soft 
loan schemes. An important tool for reducing information barriers is, for example, 
the introduction of an energy audit scheme. Important information on the average 
benefits and costs of EERE measures can be derived from such energy audits. 
These can be used as a building block for assessing risks and opportunities in en-
vironmental finance.8  
Development Finance Institutions play a prominent role in the overall informa-
tion-related setup discussed here. For example, development banks can, in their 
role of government advisor, provide valuable information on best practices with 
respect to the markets’ framework conditions. More importantly, due to their close 
relationship with the financial market, DFIs can help to directly reduce the infor-
mation barriers that hamper the development of a self-sustaining environmental 
finance market. One important instrument is to directly enhance the information 
                                                          
7 See for example Capoor and Ambrosi (2007) or Figueres and Philips (2007). 
8 WEC (2008). 
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base of commercial finance institutions through capacity building. Spreading 
knowledge on the main drivers of environmental markets will directly improve 
commercial banks’ capacity to assess risks accurately and to develop appropriate 
financing vehicles.  
In addition to direct measures for capacity building, DFIs can reduce informa-
tion barriers by applying instruments of “risk-reduced learning by doing”. This 
class of instruments includes loan guarantees, credit subsides, grants, etc. The 
general idea is that DFIs directly or indirectly assume part of the credit risk, while 
commercial banks can build up a credit history under acceptable conditions. These 
instruments accordingly lay the basis for a more informed risk assessment in the 
future and increase the expertise of commercial banks in new markets, where they 
would otherwise not be engaged. However, if such markets are supposed to be 
self-sustaining, in the future such programmes would need to be of limited dura-
tion. In this respect they differ from programmes based on the motives of poverty 
reduction or other social policy goals.  
A successful scale-up through capacity building requires that DFIs build up and 
spread knowledge on these markets within their own institutional borders. This is 
an ongoing process, far from being completed, as is shown by the example of the 
mainstreaming of carbon pricing within those institutions. While development 
banks were among the first investors in the early years of the Clean Development 
Mechanism, it is within many of the banks’ activities still not taken into account 
that greenhouse gas emissions are associated with shadow prices. As a recent 
study by the World Resources Institute points out, the partner country strategies 
vary widely with respect to the integration of concerns on climate change.9 The 
author of this study examines the level of mainstreaming of climate change within 
four major DFIs. An aggregation of the results of this study is presented in Fig-
ure 3, categorizing recent energy-related investments of the World Bank, the In-
ternational Finance Corporation (IFC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The total of energy related invest-
ments are split up among three different groups defined by the author of the WRI 
study, namely activities that integrate, mention, and ignore climate change. It is 
quite obvious that, at least until 2006, mainstreaming of climate change issues was 
not very advanced within the DFIs. This can be partly explained by the fact that 
DFIs’ strategies were slanted towards supporting few large-scale projects. Invest-
ments in renewable energy are often associated with smaller projects and therefore 
require a lower proportion of DFIs’ resources. The most recent development de-
picted might discern a rethinking in DFI strategies. The 2007 increase in consider-
ing climate change might also be a result of the topic’s increased media coverage 
within that year. The years to come will show if the learning process will endure 
in the longer term.  
                                                          
9 WRI (2008). 
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Fig. 3. Shares of Energy Investments by four major DFIs considering Climate Change 
Source: Own aggregation based on WRI (2008), Climate Change at the Multilateral Devel-
opment Banks 
As the above-mentioned research by the World Resources Institute showcases, there 
definitely exists a case for measurement and evaluation with respect to mainstream-
ing the idea of environmental markets within DFIs. The introduction of a systematic 
greenhouse gas accounting for DFI-supported projects would provide further in-
sights in future reduction potentials. The calculated project carbon footprints could 
further be used for a more holistic cost-benefit analysis for such projects, including 
external costs with respect to climate change. Within such an analysis the associated 
greenhouse gas emissions could either be valued at the current carbon price, or the 
value could be constructed based on theoretical considerations on the social cost of 
carbon, as used, for example, within the Stern Review.  
3.4 Information and Technology Brokers on Environmental Markets 
While programmes aiming at enhancing the expertise within CFIs are likely to in-
crease the supply side of environmental finance markets, fostering the demand for 
such financing vehicles would require overcoming the large information and 
transaction costs associated with this side of the market. One promising approach 
is to support information and technology brokers, following the business model of 
pooling small-scale projects into a larger-scale programme in order to participate 
in the financial gains. Clearly, supporting these aggregators is only one of many 
strategies that DFIs or governments can apply in order to increase demand in envi-
ronmental finance. However, given that this approach seems to be promising, it 
surely deserves to be considered in more detail. 
Given the above-exposed logic of environmental markets, when searching for 
potential project aggregators it is natural to look for actors that pool and implement 
small-scale projects out of self-interest. If projects were lucrative with respect to 
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their production costs, but hampered by informational and other transaction costs, 
actors capable of achieving sufficient economies of scale would still have an in-
centive to implement such projects in the long run without further government 
support. In order to achieve financially viable scale-ups, an institution acting as an 
aggregator would have to build up knowledge in different fields. First and fore-
most, acquiring expertise in the economic and technical potentials of different in-
vestments in EERE and carbon reductions is a precondition for any viable bun-
dling of small-scale projects. Second, an effective aggregator needs to know about 
potential government support and the possibilities of financing or refinancing the 
front-loaded fraction of the investments. In most cases the business concept of the 
aggregator will not be limited to the provision of this information, but will also 
include the actual implementation of the project, including the installation, moni-
toring and maintenance of the project technology. For this reason we will refer to 
this class of actors as Information & Technology Brokers.  
An effective Information & Technology Broker acting along these lines would 
not only decrease transaction costs on the demand side of environmental finance: 
the emergence of such actors can also effectively reduce information problems on 
the supply side. It can be reasonably assumed that companies procuring I&T bro-
kering have already gathered the information necessary for assessing the risks as-
sociated with potential future earnings. This information could easily feed into the 
decisions of risk capital providers as well as outside creditors. Furthermore, bun-
dling small-scale projects has the interesting side effect that the I&T Broker has 
already diversified default risks. Furthermore, an Information & Technology Bro-
ker is capable of negotiating standardized financing conditions on behalf of the 
end-users or directly providing them with upfront funding while refinancing his 
business through more standardized products. In both cases finance-related trans-
actions costs are reduced as well. 
Several institutions at least in part assuming the role of an I&T Broker are dis-
cussed within other chapters of this publication. Depending on what market is 
considered, municipalities, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), CDM project 
developers, or sometimes even utilities can fulfil the functions of such an aggrega-
tor. However, while the idea of an I&T Broker is theoretically appealing, actors 
that actually take up such a role in the real world still face significant barriers to 
the financial market. Those barriers are, in principle, not different from those dis-
cussed in the context of the financing supply side in general. Owing to a lack of 
expertise in environmental markets, CFIs have apparent problems in understand-
ing the business model underlying I&T Brokers. This problem is further increased 
by the lack of a “track record”, which is fundamental for a bank’s risk assessment. 
As a consequence, CFIs are very reluctant in providing finance to those I&T Bro-
kers that cannot provide a significant amount of collateral.  
While the general overview on information problems attempted within the pre-
vious pages is useful for understanding the interrelationships between information 
and environmental finance, this level of generality lends itself to draw only very 
rough conclusions. Any detailed discussion of measures to potentially overcome 
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the numerous information problems is beyond the restricted scope of this paper. In 
order to still be able to discuss the information-financing nexus on a more detailed 
level, the following analysis concentrates on two classes of actors that could help 
to overcome informational problems: CDM project developers and ESCOs. This 
choice is not to be interpreted as being the only field in the nexus that might repre-
sent a case for government or DFI intervention. It is rather one of many of such 
cases. However, given the necessity of scaling up small-scale activities, support-
ing these actors seems particularly promising.  
4 Case 1: CDM and the Project Developer as I&T Broker 
As already mentioned, the international climate policy framework includes a so-
phisticated system of emissions trading for greenhouse gases (GHGs), consisting 
of several different sub-markets including cap-and-trade as well as project-based 
mechanisms. This international carbon market has been fully operational since the 
beginning of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2008. Cur-
rently, the only mechanism that links developing countries and their enormous 
GHG reduction potentials to the worldwide carbon market is the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism. The general idea of the CDM is to incentivize GHG reduction 
or sink projects within developing countries that are financed by parties from in-
dustrialized countries by securitizing the offsets achieved within the project, 
which are then tradable on the carbon market. The GHG offsets achievable within 
the CDM are considerable. For the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
from 2008 to 2012, the estimates of the primary market volume range from 1.5 to 
3 billion metric tonnes of CO2-equivalents.10 Projections on the long term devel-
opment of the CDM certificate price are a difficult endeavour, as the price de-
pends also on several political decisions. The spot price on the secondary market 
for CDM certificates fluctuated in October 2008 between EUR 18 and 20 per 
tonne CO2-equivalent.11  
Initially, the underlying idea of the CDM was that an investor from an indus-
trial country provides the financing (and sometimes the implemented technology) 
to a project developer situated within a developing country. The latter was to im-
plement and operate the project activity, while the investor was still actively in-
volved in the actual operations by procuring the necessary technical know-how. 
Within the actual implementation of the mechanism, however, a different organ-
isational structure became predominant, the so-called Emission Reduction Pur-
chase Agreement (ERPA). While the simple buyer-seller structure of the purchase 
contract provides the market participants with the necessary flexibility that is 
needed in a newly created market, it has significantly altered the perception of 
                                                          
10 See Fenhann (2008a), PointCarbon (2008a), and UNFCCC (2008). 
11 PointCarbon (2008b). 
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responsibilities for the actual investments necessary within the CDM. In most im-
plemented CDM projects, the industrialized country party does not represent an 
investor providing up-front finance for implementing the project, but simply acts 
as a buyer for the certificates generated by the project. While a purchase contract 
could, in principle, also include a fixed price component paid up front, including 
such payments in advance is rather the exception for currently implemented pro-
jects involving private sector buyers.12 Hence, for most CDM projects the finan-
cial influx from the buyer’s side is reduced to the per unit payment upon delivery 
of the certificates. As a consequence, if third-party financing vehicles were un-
available the seller would take on all project-related risks. As these risks are par-
ticularly important for the availability and type of third-party financing, they are 
discussed below.  
4.1 Risks 
Like any other transboundary market, trading in CDM certificates is associated 
with currency risks, host country risks, off-take risks, and several other risk types. 
However, the fact that the CDM is a market entirely created through regulation 
entails several risks specific to that market. For example, there exists genuine un-
certainty among market participants about the continuation of the international 
climate policy regime after 2012. This risk has generally been dealt with by almost 
exclusively implementing projects which break even within the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol. While this regulatory uncertainty hampers the im-
plementation of projects which would be environmentally beneficial in the longer 
term, resolving this uncertainty is a task for governments and their climate policy 
negotiators. Market participants have to take this uncertainty as given. Another 
regulatory risk is that a project might not be recognized as being valid within the 
CDM and hence fail to be registered. As mentioned in section two, projects have 
to pass through a complicated and time-consuming regulatory process in order to 
be accepted within the CDM. Based on the experiences with projects that have 
been evaluated within this process, Fenhann (2008a) estimates that the probability 
of project rejection by the regulator is about 5%.13 
Once the project is registered within the CDM, the associated risks are, in prin-
ciple, the same as within standard project finance in developing countries. First, 
there might the standard default risk that the product to be delivered—carbon off-
sets—cannot be produced.14 In this respect CDM certificates are not different from 
                                                          
12 Capoor and Ambrosi (2007), see also Capoor and Ambrosi (2008). 
13 Note that Projects in earlier stages of the CDM cycle face in addition a probability of 
18.5% of not being registered. (Fenhann (2008a)). 
14 One specificity here is the fact that CDM credits are only being issued if the emission 
reductions are verified by a third-party verifier. There exist hence, risks associated with 
monitoring and verification. (See also section 2). 
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any other product. Due to any imaginable contingency the project might simply 
fail to produce the expected amount of deliverables. Furthermore, CDM projects 
can also suffer from risks which are associated with the uncertainty of future mar-
ket prices for carbon credits. While such sales risks do, in general, occur on any 
market, the drivers of these risks might be different within the CDM, as they are 
mainly of political or regulatory nature. For example, risks might include that 
regulatory rules determining the scarcity of carbon emission rights change (e.g. 
the so-called EU ETS risk and Post-Kyoto risk) or that the necessary infrastructure 
for carbon trading is not yet established within specific buyer countries (ITL 
risk).15 It is foreseeable that with the further development of the international cli-
mate policy framework both of these risks will diminish or even disappear. Gener-
ally, it can be observed that in sum the production and sales risks are quantifiable. 
As Fenhann (2008b) reports, the probability of a successful issuance is about 
96.3% for projects registered within the CDM. The average risk premium for these 
risks on the forward market ranges—depending on the project type—between 
EUR 2 and 5 per tonne of CO2 equivalent.16  
In summary, as far as the associated risks are concerned, financing CDM pro-
jects does, in principle, not differ from standard project finance. However, there 
exist some particularities to the CDM which require a diligent assessment. Impor-
tantly, CDM-specific risks are generally quantifiable and hence manageable, pro-
vided the required knowledge base is established.  
4.2 The Challenge for Financial Institutions 
Given the specificities of the CDM market, there exists not only a large need, but 
also a lucrative potential, for financial services in this market. There is an urgent 
need for financial vehicles that allow the future cash flow from certificate sales to 
be frontloaded and used for project investments. In principle, such vehicles could 
involve both equity as well as debt finance. A growing number of “carbon funds” 
provide equity finance for CDM projects, while pooling the risks over a large port-
folio of projects. Cochran and Leguet (2007) estimate that in 2007 EUR 7 billion 
was invested in 58 carbon funds; they project an increase up to EUR 9.4 billion of 
total fund capitalization in 2008. While in the “trial phase” of the CDM from 2000 
to 2005, these funds were mainly operated by development finance institutions 
and governments, the recent increase in projects financed by carbon funds is to the 
largest part attributable to private sector engagement (see Figure 4). This devel-
opment is an example of DFIs’ successful pioneering in the field of green finance.  
                                                          
15 For further reading on the different risks associated with the CDM, see UNEP RISOE 
(2007). 
16 According to PointCarbon (2008a), in 2007 issued CERs fetched between EUR 14 and 
17, while forward prices on CERs from registered projects yielded EUR 12 on average. 
This is in line with the observations by Capoor and Ambrosi (2008), who present evi-
dence for an issuance risk premium of about EUR 3. 
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Fig. 4. Evolution of CDM Investment Capital by Vehicle Managing Agent 
Source: Cochran and Leguet (2007) 
However, in light of the fact that CDM risks are quite manageable, there exists a 
priori no reason why part of the financing of CDM projects should not be taken 
over by outside creditors. While there are a few examples of CDM projects partly 
financed by loans from large international banks, CFIs in developing countries 
still seem reluctant to enter this market. One of the major reasons for this reluc-
tance is the fact that assessing the risks associated with CDM projects requires a 
significant amount of knowledge on the project activity as well as a deep under-
standing of the specificities of the carbon market. Thus, it is likely that with a ma-
turing of the market the amount of debt financing will further increase. However, 
there may be a case for DFI intervention in this specific market based on the 
above-depicted reasoning of “risk-reduced learning by doing”. In order to generate 
such an experience base for reluctant CFIs in specific countries, DFIs might inter-
vene by taking over a part of the credit risk through grants or by subsidizing inter-
est over a limited time period. A further reduction of financial market barriers in-
duced by lack of knowledge is likely to significantly foster the CDM’s environ-
mental effectiveness while at the same time tapping its potential to contribute to 
sustainable development.  
4.3 Small-Scale Projects and the Potential of Programmatic CDM  
The Clean Development Mechanism is often misperceived as being only capable 
of incentivizing large-scale projects. This is not surprising, as the implementation 
of large-scale projects, like those involving geo-thermal or tidal power generation, 
is usually well covered by the media. Furthermore, the CDM accreditation process 
clearly entails significant transaction costs; therefore, only projects of a certain 
size become financially viable within the mechanism. However, the Kyoto rules 
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also provide for simpler procedures concerning small-scale projects.17 A closer 
look at the CDM project pipeline, which includes all projects currently registered 
or under review, reveals that implementing such small-scale projects within the 
CDM is quite popular. As of May 2008, 1462 projects in the pipeline, i.e. 44% of 
all projects, were small-scale.18 
To be eligible as a CDM small-scale project, the respective project should not 
exceed specific thresholds. For example, the reduction in energy consumption at-
tributable to the project activity should not exceed 15 GWh per year.19 Hence, for 
energy-intensive SMEs or municipalities, small-scale CDM might be a lucrative 
option to leverage investments in EERE. Projects on the level of single households 
would be, however, not financially viable, as the transaction costs associated with 
the mechanism would far exceed the potential gains from the project. There exists, 
however, the possibility to pool EERE activities in many different households into 
one single CDM project. It is in this respect that an ingenious CDM project devel-
oper can become an I&T-Broker.  
A good example for such a pooling of household activities into a small-scale 
CDM project is the Kuyasa low-cost urban housing upgrade project, in Cape Town, 
South Africa. This project involves EERE upgrades within a low-income housing 
settlement in Khayelitsha, a township located on the south-eastern side of the City 
of Cape Town. The project activity consists of retrofitting 2309 state-subsidised 
30m2 housing units with three simple EERE measures: the installation of solar wa-
ter heaters, insulated ceilings and compact fluorescent light bulbs. These measures 
are generating reductions in CO2 emissions of about 2.85 tonnes per household per 
year. The total project reduction is approximately 6,580 tonnes of CO2 equivalents 
per annum. As these effects are estimated to accumulate over a 21 year period, the 
overall impact on emissions is considerable. The savings in energy costs for a sin-
gle household are estimated to be approximately ZAR 625.84 (USD 63) per year. 
The measures are further expected to reduce health costs by approximately ZAR 
685 (USD 69) per household per annum.20  
The above example showcases that the pooling of project activities at the 
household level is already possible under the standard CDM rules for small-scale 
projects. However, given that the number of household participating must be known 
before the start of the project, these rules certainly have some limitations to trigger 
wide-spread EERE measures in developing countries. For this reason, a new set of 
rules has been added recently to the CDM framework allowing for Programmes of 
                                                          
17 See UNFCCC(2002), Decision 17 and Annex. 
18 See Fenhann (2008c). 
19 Further criteria for eligibility under the CDM small-scale regime are reductions in en-
ergy consumption below 15 GWh/year, and emission reductions of less than 15 kilo 
tonnes of CO2 equivalents. See UNFCCC(2002), decision 17, §6(c). 
20 See CDM PDD (2005) and SouthSouthNorth (2005). 
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Activities (PoA).21 These rules open the possibility to register an unlimited num-
ber of CDM project activities under a single CDM programme. A Programme of 
Activities may be coordinated by a public or private entity and, in principle, may 
include any voluntary sets of measures that result in additional emission reduc-
tions. Given the novelty of the instrument, by 1 November 2008, only five PoAs 
were under CDM validation. These programmes involve: home solar systems in 
Bangladesh, biodigesters in small pork farms in Brazil, solar water heaters in 
South Africa, Compact Fluorescent Lights in Mexico, and municipal waste com-
posting in Uganda. The difference in technologies used within these different pro-
grammes is an indication of the large potential for triggering small-scale EERE 
investments that rests within future CDM PoA implementations.22 Another advan-
tage is that the income from PoAs, which is generated through certificate sales, 
can be easily channelled back to the end-users, either through consumer credits for 
individual purchases of household appliances, or for SMEs through microfinanc-
ing structures for enterprise development. 
Many observers of the CDM have pointed out that the procedural and methodo-
logical CDM rules need refinement in order to reduce the hurdles impeding the 
development of PoAs. In this context, the importance of information generation 
for scaling-up environmental markets is once again quite obvious. Given that 
regulators, like market participants, are still in a learning phase, the rules for the 
mechanisms are sequentially adjusted. These adjustments are based on regular 
‘calls for input’ generating useful feedback by the market participants. As to the 
further development of the PoA rules, the early lessons will be discussed and in-
corporated at the next meetings of the parties of the Kyoto Protocol in Posnan, Po-
land and Copenhagen, Denmark.  
Pooling of CDM projects within small-scale rules and PoAs encounter the 
same barriers to project financing vehicles as CDM projects in general. In many 
PoAs, the sales of certificates will be the only cash income (e.g. with energy ef-
ficiency measures). This exacerbates the above-described problem of front-
loaded implementation costs and cash flows occurring only at a later time. As 
Figueres and Philips (2007) point out, few financial institutions are willing to 
absorb the corresponding risk, as risk assessment for new instruments which 
lack a credit history is always difficult. Hence, while CDM project developers in 
the longer term could well fulfil the role of an I&T Broker, it is likely that in the 
short-term, they will remain dependent on the build-up of expertise within de-
veloping countries’ CFIs. Here, there clearly exists a case for intervention either 
by DFIs or governments.  
                                                          
21 See CDM EB (2007), Annexes 28–31. 
22 See CDM Project Database, available online at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/index.html. 
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5 Case 2: Energy Service Companies 
Many small-scale EERE investments are already financially viable even without 
including revenues from the carbon market.23 Still, informational barriers on the 
supply and demand side of the environmental finance market hamper the imple-
mentation of such measures. Again, supporting actors interested in bundling pro-
jects could be an effective instrument to facilitate small-scale EERE investments. 
In many countries the role of an I&T Broker on this market is assumed by energy 
service companies, or ESCOs (see the chapter by MacLean in this publication). 
These companies offer primarily end-user energy efficiency improvement services 
while receiving a share in the resulting savings in return. Such services generally 
include the design of energy efficiency projects for specific end-users, consulting 
on potential financial leverage (like subsidy schemes), the installation and mainte-
nance of the necessary equipment, and monitoring and verification of a project’s 
energy savings. Usually, the remuneration of ESCO is linked to the financial per-
formance of the implemented measures. This fits well into the paradigm of envi-
ronmental markets, as the financial performance of the measures directly depends 
on the environmental variable, i.e. the amount of energy saved.  
An ESCO’s business model also includes either the direct financing of the sin-
gle project or acting as a mediator between its customers and commercial banks. 
While this is likely to reduce the transaction costs per project, it also shifts the re-
sponsibility to overcome the barriers on the financial market to the ESCO. 
Whereas ESCOs in industrialized countries can rely on a mature financial sector 
for project financing, ESCOs in developing countries experience considerable dif-
ficulties in securing funding for projects. Survey results presented in the World 
Energy Council (2008) reveal that ESCOs seeking financing face interest rates of 
up to 50–70%. The reasons for such high refinancing costs are again mostly of in-
formational nature. As many observers point out, banks and other financial institu-
tions often lack experience in lending to ESCOs. As a consequence, CFIs consider 
energy services as a risky business, while the financial model involved is not fully 
understood.24 In most cases the perception of risks is not based on fundamental 
market data, as these simply do not yet exist. Hence, the fundamental informa-
tional problem which is at the heart of finance supply restrictions for EERE per-
sists, even if ESCOs emerge on the market. As a result, ESCOs themselves tend to 
lend only to clients that have the highest levels of creditworthiness, and hence 
preferably engage in projects in the public sector. While in some newly industrial-
izing countries—like for example in Brazil or India—ESCOs also finance indus-
trial sector projects, the residential sector is usually not covered. 25 If ESCOs are 
                                                          
23 In such a case, EERE investments would simply not fulfil the stringent additionality cri-
teria of the CDM. 
24 See for example Painuly et al. (2003), World Bank (2008), and WEC (2008). 
25 See WEC (2008). 
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to become successful I&T Brokers for smaller-scale projects, reducing financial 
market barriers will be of primary importance.26 Since ESCOs in developing coun-
tries are often new start-ups and not spin-offs of larger companies, the financial 
sector is particularly reluctant to provide financing for such companies. 
One of the most important instruments for industry start-up is, therefore, co-
financing by governments or DFIs, for example through guarantees, start-up loans, 
loan loss reserve funds, special purpose funds, or interest credits. The most popu-
lar of these instruments is the provision of guarantees. The Brazilian government, 
for example, has created a guarantee facility which is partly aimed at fostering the 
development of ESCOs, called PROSECO. Within this facility the Brazilian Na-
tional Development Bank (BNDES) shares up to 80–100% of the ESCO’s credit 
risk, while the remaining risk is taken over by the intermediary bank.27  
Such grants represent an instrument to foster “risk-reduced learning by doing” 
for commercial banks, as discussed in section 3. Such instruments provide a con-
trolled-risk environment, within which commercial banks can train to assess the 
economic potential which lies within the ESCO model. As far as ESCOs in Brazil 
are concerned, such further training is likely to be welcome. While Brazilian ES-
COs generated returns of about BRL 500 million (USD 250 million) in 2006, this 
represents only 2% of the expected market potential.28 
Another very successful example for jump-starting an ESCO industry is the 
World Bank/GEF-supported programme in China. An initial industry develop-
ment project starting in 1997 included the set-up of three ESCOs, each provided 
with USD 5 million of GEF grant support and USD 21 million of IBRD loan 
funds for scaling-up their business. The majority of projects implemented by the 
three pilot ESCOs were small-sized programmes in the fields of building reno-
vation, boiler/cogeneration, kiln/furnace, and waste heat/gas recovery. The 
commercial success of the pilot companies was key for other companies’ deci-
sion to enter the newly created market. These were also provided with technical 
assistance from the UK’s Department for International Development. A second 
project with USD 26 million of GEF financing through the World Bank was 
started in October 2002. The objective was to further foster China’s ESCO in-
dustry up to a national scale. This project includes a major loan guarantee pro-
gramme and the provision of training, technical assistance, as well as policy de-
velopment support for emerging ESCOs. 29  
                                                          
26 As Painuly et al (2003) point out, there exists a plethora of other, mostly institutional 
barriers for the development of ESCOs, like weak legal frameworks or unfavourable 
public procurement practices. These are, however, beyond the actual scope of this paper 
concentrating on information barriers and finance. 
27 See BNDS (2008). 
28 See BfAI (2007). 
29 World Bank (2008). 
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The example of ESCO development in China is often quoted in the literature as 
a successful example for leveraging energy efficiency investments in developing 
countries. Indeed, the program’s track record is impressive. In 2006, China’s in-
dustry had grown to more than 60 ESCOs. Overall project investment volume in 
this year was about USD 280 million.30 As most of the new market entrants did 
not receive large-scale support, the programme can be rightfully considered as a 
catalyser for a viable and promising new industry that can act as a I&T broker. 
Given the right framework conditions, the successful model might be replicable 
within other developing countries as well. 
In general, ESCOs are likely to be in need of start-up support in most develop-
ing countries before being able to play the role of an aggregator. Instruments for 
such support should be, however, designed in a way that fosters learning on both 
sides of the financing market. Successful ESCOs would need to increase their 
knowledge on tapping the potential of lucrative EERE opportunities in the 
smaller-scale. As to the supply side of financing, programmes that provide a risk-
reduced learning environment with limited duration seem to perform quite well. In 
the longer-term perspective the acquired expertise is likely to lead to a risk as-
sessment that is rather based on the actual risks rather than unfounded expecta-
tions. A direct consequence of this learning process would be an improvement of 
financing terms for ESCOs. This, in turn, could lead to the development and scale-
up of a viable energy service industry which in the longer term does not need fur-
ther direct support. 
6 Conclusion  
The logic of market-based instruments in environmental policy is to use the profit 
motive for environmental improvements. This is usually achieved by privatizing 
an environmental good in a way that the results of these improvements are made 
tradable through securitization or by using already existing price mechanisms 
which are related – at least closely enough – to the environmental variables. The 
former is the case with emissions trading markets, while the latter applies to 
EERE. As a consequence, if the market is carefully designed, the achievement of 
environmental objectives for these markets can be more or less directly deduced 
from the actual market volume.  
Within this paper we have established the case that informational considera-
tions with respect to environmental markets need to go beyond the standard para-
digm of simple measurement. It is argued that the major difference between envi-
ronmental finance and standard project finance is not within the general market 
setup, but lies rather in the persisting information barriers that characterize the 
former. It can, for example, be argued that the lack of demand for financing small-
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
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scale projects is to a large extent due to rational or irrational ignorance with re-
spect to the potential gains. The supply side on the other hand seems to have a 
significant lack of knowledge on the principal mechanisms driving these markets 
and on how to systematically assess the associated risks. 
Evidently, the informational problems identified here can only explain a part of 
the underprovision of environmental project finance. However, instruments that 
reduce these information barriers are very likely to lead to an increase in market 
volume. One measure that seems to be promising for fostering small-scale invest-
ments is the bundling of such projects by an I&T Broker. In principle, such bro-
kers are capable of yielding economies of scale and scope by pooling small- and 
medium-scale projects. While the development of such aggregators is clearly not a 
magic bullet solving all inefficiencies on the environmental markets, there is 
promising anecdotal evidence suggesting that this can effectively reduce the in-
formation barriers on the demand side. These examples show that project pooling 
can significantly increase the amount of implemented projects. We have examined 
two actors that could assume such a role more closely: the CDM project developer 
and energy service companies. As it turns out, while these actors could be quite 
effective in bundling projects and hence scaling-up the demand side, they still en-
counter significant problems for interim financing for the respective investments. 
In fact, the informational problem on the supply side of environmental finance 
seems to persist. While there is growing evidence that the risks associated with 
CDM and EERE projects are manageable, commercial finance institutions still 
seem reluctant to procure finance for these endeavours. Many observers of these 
markets point to the fact that this reluctance is rather based on a general lack of 
expertise with respect to the newly created markets, rather than a rational assess-
ment of project risks. In light of these observations, it is important to improve 
CFIs’ capacity to collect and process information on technical and economic po-
tentials in all considered fields, i.e. GHG emissions mitigation measures, measures 
to increase energy efficiency, and projects using renewable energy resources. In 
this context there exists a case for government or DFI intervention. The approach 
of several development banks in particular – to provide risk-reduced environments 
for learning by doing – yielded promising results in both markets. As several of 
the quoted examples have shown, guarantee programs of limited duration can help 
to jump-start an I&T Broker industry which would be viable in the long run. In the 
field of the CDM, where DFIs were among the first to provide start-up equity, 
they provided valuable first-mover experience to the market, generating informa-
tion on the actual risks for the private sector. In the field of carbon funds, private 
sector engagement has recently overtaken the volumes provided by DFIs. A simi-
lar effort would be needed for starting up successful programmatic CDM projects 
where governments could also play a significant role. 
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